The purpose of this paper is to re-investigate the estimation of multiple factor models by relaxing the convention that the number of factors is small. We first obtain the collection of all possible factors and we provide a simultaneous test, security by security, of which factors are significant. Since the collection of risk factors selected for investigation is large and highly correlated, we use dimension reduction methods, including the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) and prototype clustering, to perform the investigation. For comparison with the existing literature, we compare the multi-factor model's performance with the Fama-French 5-factor model. We find that both the Fama-French 5-factor and the multi-factor model are consistent with the behavior of "large-time scale" security returns. In a goodnessof-fit test comparing the Fama-French 5-factor with the multi-factor model, the multi-factor model has a substantially larger adjusted R 2 . Robustness tests confirm that the multi-factor model provides a reasonable characterization of security returns.
Introduction
A goal of the empirical asset pricing literature, since the discovery of the Sharpe (1964) [18] , Lintner (1965) [15] , and Mossin (1966)'s capital asset pricing model (CAPM), has been to determine whether security returns are consistent with market equilibrium. Thousands of empirical papers have investigated this question, see Jagannathan, Schaumburg, and Zhou [11] for a review. Originally, tests of the static CAPM focused on the implication that a single factor, the market portfolio, was sufficient to characterize returns. The single factor representation was quickly replaced by multi-factor models, which were motivated by: (i) Merton's (1973) [16] intertemporal CAPM, where additional factors are needed to hedge changes in the stochastic investment opportunity set (drifts and covariances of returns), and (ii) Ross's (1976) [17] static arbitrage pricing theory (APT), where additional factors represent non-diversifiable risks embedded in a security's return process.
Motivated by the development of the theory from a single to multiple factors, and constrained by the computational limitations of inverting large matrices in linear regressions, the empirical literature has since focused on sequentially adding a small number of factors to the market portfolio in an attempt to explain security returns. One of the most famous of these representations is the Fama-French (1993) [6] five-factor model (FF5). Recently, Harvey, Liu, Zhu (2016) [9] reviewed the literature, the collection of factors employed, and argued for the need to use an alternative statistical methodology to sequentially test for new factors. A consequence of this voluminous literature is the widely accepted convention (and belief) that only a small number of factors is (or should be) needed to characterize equilibrium returns.
If one steps back and reflects on the both theory and the empirical literature, it is evident that neither of these a priori restricts the number of relevant factors to be small. Indeed, in Merton's ICAPM, the number of factors can be as large as the number of Brownian motions generating the randomness in the economy. And, there is no compelling reason to believe that the randomness in security returns is generated by only a small number of Brownian motions. Similarly in Ross's APT, with a countably infinite number of traded securities, the number of non-diversifiable factors could be quite large (say in the thousands) and still be consistent with the theory. And as noted earlier, on the empirical side the sequential addition of a small number of factors to fitted linear regressions was surely motivated by the computational limitations inherent in estimating regressions with a large number of independent variables. It is the limitations of the computational and statistical procedures, and not an empirical truth, that motivated this methodology.
The purpose of this paper is to re-investigate the estimation of multiple factor models by relaxing the convention that the number of factors is small. The idea is to: first, obtain the collection of all possible factors, and second, to provide a simultaneous test, security by security, of which factors are significant. However, there are several challenges that must be overcome to execute this estimation. First, due to the assumption that the regression coefficients (β's) are constant, it's necessary to run the estimation over a small time window because for longer time windows the β's are likely to change. This implies that the number of sample points may be less than the number of independent variables (n < p), where the ordinary least squares (OLS) solution no longer holds. Second, the collection of risk factors selected for investigation will be highly correlated. And, it is well known that large correlation among independent variables causes difficulties (redundant factors selected, low fitting accuracy etc., see [10] ) in applying the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO). We handle these difficulties by using the LASSO accompanied with other methods, including prototype clustering.
To test our model, we use all security returns in the CRSP (The Center for Research in Security Prices) database over the three year time period from January 2014 to December 2016. The collection of potential risk factors is chosen to be the set of Exchange-Traded Funds (ETF) in the CRSP database, plus the Fama-French 5 factors. In recent years there are more than one thousand ETFs, which are highly correlated. To remove redundant ETFs, we group the ETFs into different asset classes and find good representatives within each class that have low pairwise correlations. This reduced set of ETFs forms our potential risk factors. Unfortunately, after finding this set of factors, the number of observations (n) is still smaller than (or at least close to) the number of independent risk factors (p), which puts us in a high-dimensional regime.
Based on the insights of Jarrow and Protter (2016) [12] , it is reasonable to assume that although there are a large number of risk factors, each security is related to only a small number of these ETFs, but different companies can be related to different factors. This makes intuitive sense since an Asian company is probably subject to different risks than is a U.S. company. This insight justifies a sparse structure for the estimated coefficient matrix, which leads to the use of a LASSO regression. Since the set of selected factors are constructed to have low correlation, the methodology is appropriate for this application. Thus, for each individual security in our data set, a LASSO regression is used to determine the set of factors that are important for its return. Then, to be consistent with the literature, we fit an OLS regression on each security's return with respect to its factors (that are selected by LASSO) to perform an intercept (α) and a goodness of fit test.
Using the recent theoretical insights of Jarrow and Protter (2016) [12] , the intercept test can be interpreted as a test of the traditional asset pricing model under the assumptions of frictionless, competitive, and arbitrage-free markets (more formally, the existence of an equivalent martingale measure). This traditional approach abstracts from market microstructure frictions, such as bid-ask spreads and execution speeds (costs), and strategic trading considerations, such as high-frequency trading. To be consistent with this abstraction, we study returns over a weekly time interval, where the market microstructure frictions and strategic trading considerations are arguably less relevant. If we fail to reject a zero alpha, we accept this abstraction, thereby providing support for the assertion that the frictionless, competitive, and arbitrage-free market construct is a good representation of "large time scale" security returns. If the model is accepted, a goodness of fit test quantifies the explanatory power of the model relative to the actual time series variations in security returns. A "good" model is one where the model error (the difference between the model's predictions and actual returns) behaves like white noise with a "small" variance. The adjusted R 2 provides a good metric of comparison in this regard.
Conversely, if we reject a zero alpha, then this is evidence consistent with either: (i) that microstructure considerations are necessary to understand "large time scale" as well as "short time scale" returns or (ii) that there exist arbitrage opportunities in the market. This second possibility is consistent with the traditional model being a valid description of reality, but that markets are inefficient. To distinguish between these two alternatives, we note that a non-zero intercept enables the identification of these "alleged" arbitrage opportunities, constructed by forming trading strategies to exploit the existence of these "positive alphas." The implementation of these trading strategies enables a test between these two alternatives.
Here is a brief summary of our results.
• For both the Fama-French 5-factor and the multi-factor models, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the intercept is zero for all securities in the sample. This implies that both models are consistent with the behavior of "large-time scale" security returns.
• In a goodness-of-fit test comparing the Fama-French 5-factor and the multi-factor model, the multi-factor model has a substantially larger adjusted R 2 and the difference of goodness-of-fit of two models are significant. This documents the multi-factor model's superior performance in characterizing security returns.
• As a robustness test, for those securities whose intercepts were non-zero (although insignificant), we tested the multi-factor model to see if positive alpha trading strategies generate arbitrage opportunities. They do not, thereby confirming the zero intercept tests.
• The resulting multi-factor model estimated contains 136 factors. 54 of these factors are significant for some stock, implying that a large number of factors are needed to explain security returns. On average each stock is related to only 4.15 factors, with most stocks having between 1 ∼ 10 significant factors. Furthermore, different securities are related to different factors validating the sparsity assumption discussed above.
In conclusion, the multi-factor model estimated in this paper is shown to be consistent with the data and superior to the Fama-French 5-factor model. An outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the dimension reduction methods used in this paper. Section 3 presents the multifactor model to be estimated, and Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 presents some illustrative examples and Section 6 concludes.
High-dimensional Statistical Methodology
Since high-dimensional statistics is relatively new to the finance literature, this section reviews the relevant statistical methodology.
Preliminaries and Notations
Let v p denote the standard l p norm of a vector v, i.e.
Suppose β is a vector with dimension p × 1, a set S ⊆ {1, 2, ..., p}, then β S is a p × 1 vector with i-th element
Here S is called the support of β, in other words, supp(β) = {i : β i = 0}. Similarly, if X is a matrix instead of a vector, then X S are the columns of X indexed by S. Denote 1 n as a n × 1 vector with all elements being 1, J n = 1 n 1 n andJ n = 1 n J n . I n denotes the identity matrix with diagonal 1 and 0 elsewhere. The subscript n is always omitted when the dimension n is clear from the context. The notation #S means the number of elements in the set S.
Prototype Clustering
This section describes the prototype clustering to be used to deal with the problem of high correlation among the independent variables in our LASSO regressions. To remove unnecessary independent variables, using clustering methods, we classify them into similar groups and then choose representatives from each group with small pairwise correlations. First, we define a distance metric to measure the similarity between points (in our case, the returns of the independent variables). Here, the distance metric is related to the correlation of the two points, i.e.
where r i = (r i,t , r i,t+1 , ..., r i,T ) is the time series vector for independent variable i = 1, 2 and corr(r 1 , r 2 ) is their correlation. Second, the distance between two clusters needs to be defined. Once a cluster distance is defined, hierarchical clustering methods (see [14] ) can be used to organize the data into trees. In these trees, each leaf corresponds to one of the original data points. Agglomerative hierarchical clustering algorithms build trees in a bottom-up approach, initializing each cluster as a single point, then merging the two closest clusters at each successive stage. This merging is repeated until only one cluster remains. Traditionally, the distance between two clusters is defined as either a complete distance, single distance, average distance, or centroid distance. However, all of these approaches suffer from interpretation difficulties and inversions (which means parent nodes can sometimes have a lower distance than their children), see Bien, Tibshirani (2011) [4] . To avoid these difficulties, Bien, Tibshirani (2011) [4] introduced hierarchical clustering with prototypes via a minimax linkage measure, defined as follows. For any point x and cluster C, let
be the distance to the farthest point in C to x. Define the minimax radius of the cluster C as
that is, this measures the distance from the farthest point x ∈ C which is as close as possible to all the other elements in C. We call the minimizing point the prototype for C. Intuitively, it is the point at the center of this cluster. The minimax linkage between two clusters G and H is then defined as
Using this approach, we can easily find a good representative for each cluster, which is the prototype defined above. It is important to note that minimax linkage trees do not have inversions. Also, in our application as described below, to guarantee interpretable and tractability, using a single representative independent variable is better than using other approaches (for example, principal components analysis (PCA)) which employ linear combinations of the independent variables.
LASSO Regressions
The Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) method was introduced by Tibshirani (1996) [22] for model selection when the number of independent variables (p) is larger than the number of sample observations (n). The method is based on the idea that instead of minimizing the squared loss to derive the OLS solution for a regression, we should add to the loss a penalty on the absolute value of the coefficients to minimize the absolute value of the non-zero coefficients selected. To illustrate the procedure, suppose that we have a linear model
X is an n × p matrix, y and are n × 1 vectors, and β is a p × 1 vector. The LASSO estimator of β is given bŷ
where λ > 0 is the tuning parameter, which determines the magnitude of the penalty on the absolute value of non-zero β's.
In the subsequent estimation, we will only use LASSO as a model selection method to find the collection of important independent variables. After the important factors are selected, we use a standard OLS regression on these variables to test for the goodness of fit and significance of the coefficients. More discussion of this approach can be found in Zhao, Shojaie, Witten (2017) [27] .
The Multi-Factor Asset Pricing Model
This section presents the multi-factor asset pricing model that is estimated using the high-dimensional statistical methods just discussed. Given is a frictionless, competitive, and arbitrage free market. In this setting, a dynamic generalization of Ross's (1976) [17] APT and Merton's (1973) [16] ICAPM derived by Jarrow and Protter (2016) [12] implies that the following relation holds for any security's return:
where at time t, R i (t) denotes the return of the i-th security for 1 ≤ i ≤ N (where N is the number of securities), r j (t) denotes the return used as the j-th risk factor for 1 ≤ j ≤ p, r 0 (t) is the risk free rate, r(t) = (r 1 (t), r 2 (t), ..., r p (t)) denotes the vector of security returns, 1 is a column vector with every element equal to one, and β i = (β i,1 , β i,2 , ..., β i,p ) . This generalized APT requires that the risk factors are represented by traded assets. In Jarrow and Protter (2016) [12] the collection of risk factors form an algebraic basis that spans the set of security returns. Consistent with this formulation, we use traded ETFs. In addition, to apply the LASSO method, for each security i we assume that only a small number of the β i,j coefficients are non-zero (β i has the sparsity property). Lastly, to facilitate estimation, we also assume that the β i,j coefficients are constant over time, i.e. β i,j (t) = β i,j . This assumption is an added restriction, not implied by the theory. It is only a reasonable approximation if the time period used in our estimation is not too long (we will return to this issue subsequently).
To empirically test our model, both an intercept α i and a noise term i (t) are added to expression (7) , that is,
The error term is included to account for noise in the data and "random" model error, i.e. model error that is unbiased and inexplicable according to the independent variables included within the theory. If our theory is useful in explaining security returns, this error should be small and the adjusted R 2 large. The α intercept is called Jensen's alpha. Using the recent theoretical insights of Jarrow and Protter (2016) [12] , the intercept test can be interpreted as a test of the traditional asset pricing model under the assumptions of frictionless, competitive, and arbitrage-free markets (more formally, the existence of an equivalent martingale measure). This traditional approach abstracts from market microstructure frictions, such as bid-ask spreads and execution speeds (costs), and strategic trading considerations, such as high-frequency trading. To be consistent with this abstraction, we study returns over a weekly time interval, where the market microstructure frictions and strategic trading considerations are arguably less relevant. If we fail to reject a zero alpha, we accept this abstraction, thereby providing support for the assertion that the frictionless, competitive, and arbitrage-free market construct is a good representation of "large time scale" security returns. If the model is accepted, a goodness of fit test quantifies the explanatory power of the model relative to the actual time series variations in security returns. The adjusted R 2 provides a good test in this regard.
Conversely, if we reject a zero alpha, then this is evidence consistent with either: (i) that microstructure considerations are necessary to understand "large time scale" as well as "short time scale" returns or (ii) that there exist arbitrage opportunities in the market. This second possibility is consistent with the traditional model being a valid description of reality, but that markets are inefficient. To distinguish between these two alternatives, we note that a non-zero intercept enables the identification of these "alleged" arbitrage opportunities, constructed by forming trading strategies to exploit the existence of these "positive alphas."
Using weekly returns over a short time period necessitates the use of high-dimensional statistics. To understand why, consider the following. For a given time period (t, T ), letting n = T − t + 1, we can rewrite expression (8) using time series vectors as
where i ∼ N (0, σ 2 i I n ) and
. . .
Recall that we assume that the coefficients β ij are constants. This assumption is only reasonable when the time period (t, T ) is small, say three years, so the number of observations n ≈ 150 given we employ weekly data. Therefore, our sample size n in this regression is substantially less than the number of risk factors p.
We fit a LASSO regression (after prototype clustering) to select the factor set S (S is derived near the end). Then, the model becomes
Here, the intercept and the significance of each factor can be tested, making the identifications y = R i − r 0 and X = r − r 0 1 p in expression (5) and a goodness of fit test based on the R 2 can be employed.
An example of expression (12) is the Fama-French (1993) [6] five-factor model. The five traded factors are: (i) the market portfolio less the spot rate of interest (R m − R f ), (ii) a portfolio representing the performance of small (market capital) versus big (market capital) companies (SM B), (iii) a portfolio representing the performance of high book-to-market ratio versus small book-tomarket ratio companies (HM L), (iv) a portfolio representing the performance of robust (high) profit companies versus that of weak (low) profits (RM W ), and (v) a portfolio representing the performance of firms investing conservatively and those investing aggressively (CM A), i.e.
The key difference between the Fama-French five-factor and expression (12) is that (12) allows distinct securities to be related to different risk factors, chosen from a larger set of risk factors than just these five. In fact, we allow the number of risk factors p to be quite large (e.g. over one thousand), which enables the number of non-zero coefficients β i to be different for different securities. As noted above, we also assume the coefficient vector β i to be sparse. The traditional literature, which includes the Fama-French five-factor model, limits the regression to a small number of factors. In contrast, using the LASSO method, we are able to fit our model using time series data when n < p, as long as the β i coefficients are sparse and the risk factors are not highly correlated.
As noted previously, we handle this second issue via clustering methods.
The Estimation Results
This section discusses the details of the estimation procedure for the multi-factor model. The data consists of security returns and all the ETFs available in the CRSP (The Center for Research in Security Prices) database over the three year time period from January 2014 to December 2016. In addition, in the collection of factors we include the five Fama-French factors. A security is included in our sample only if it has prices available for more than 2/3 of all the trading weeks. For easy comparison, companies are classified according to the first 2 digits of their SIC code (a detailed description of SIC code classes can be found in Appendix C). Suppose that we are given p 1 tradable factors r 1 , r 2 , ..., r p1 . In our investigation, these are returns on traded ETFs, and for comparison to the literature, the Fama-French 5 factors. Using recent year data, the number of ETFs is large, slightly over 1000 (p 1 ≈ 1000). Since these factors are highly-correlated, it is problematic to fit R i − r 0 directly on these factors using a LASSO regression. Hence, we use the Prototype Clustering method discussed in section 2.2 to reduce the number of factors by selecting low-correlated representatives. Then, we fit the LASSO regression to these low-correlated representatives. This improves the fitting accuracy and also selects a sparser and more interpretable model.
For notation simplicity, denote y i = R i − r 0 , X i = r i − r 0 , and X = r − r 0 . Let r 1 denote the market return. It is easy to check that most of the ETF factors X i are correlated with X 1 (the market return minus the risk free rate). We note that this pattern is not true for the other four Fama-French factors. Therefore, we first orthogonalize every other factor to X 1 before doing the clustering and LASSO regression. By orthogonalizing with respect to the market return, we avoid choosing redundant factors similar to it and meanwhile, increase the accuracy of fitting. Note that for OLS, projection does not affect the estimation since it only affects the coefficients, not the estimationŷ. However, in LASSO, projection does affect the set of selected factors because it changes the magnitude of the coefficients before shrinking. Thus, we compute
where P X1 denotes the projection operator. Denote the vector X = (X 1 , X 2 , X 3 , ..., X p1 ). Note that this is equivalent to the residuals after regressing other factors on the market return minus the risk free rate. The transformed ETF factors X contain highly correlated members. We first divide these factors into categories A 1 , A 2 , ..., A k based on their financial description obtained from the website www.etfdb.com. Note that
The list of categories with more descriptions can be found in Appendix A. The categories are (1) bond/fixed income, (2) currency, (3) diversified portfolio, (4) equity, (5) alternative ETFs, (6) inverse, (7) leveraged, (8) real estate, and (9) volatility.
Next, from each category we need to choose a set of representatives. These representatives should span the categories they are from, but also have low correlation with each other. This can be done by using the prototype-clustering method with distance defined by equation (1), which yield the "prototypes" (representatives) within each cluster (intuitively, the prototype is at the center of each cluster) with low-correlations.
Within each category, we first calculate the PCA dimension that explains 80% of the variance. Then, we use the prototype clustering methods previously discussed to find the set of representatives. The number of representatives in each category is expected to be similar to the principal components analysis (PCA) dimension. This gives the sets
Although this reduction procedure guarantees low-correlation between the elements in each B i , it does not guarantee low-correlation across the elements in the union B. So, an additional step is needed, which is prototype clustering on B to find a low-correlated representatives set U . Note that U ⊂ B. Denote p 2 ≡ #U . The list of all ETFs in the set U is given in Appendix B. This is still a large set with p 2 = 136.
Since risk factors in X U are not highly correlated, a LASSO regression can be applied. By equation (6), we have that
where we set λ = min{λ : #supp( β i ) ≤ 20}. In sensitivity testing with different λ's, we confirmed that the number of factors selected was relatively insensitive to the choice of the λ. Consequently, we report the results for only this λ. Further discussion of the choice of λ can be found in Section 6. Denote S i ≡ supp( β i ) to be the set of factors selected by the LASSO regression. Next, we fit an OLS regression on the selected factors. Since this is an OLS regression, we use the original factors X S i rather than the orthogonalized factors with respect to the market return X S . Note that after the above procedure there might be some factors in the set S still correlated with the market return (X 1 ) because of that we projected out the market return before removing the highcorrelated columns and that we pick about 20 factors for each company with LASSO (some weak factors may still be selected if there are not enough strong factors.) Therefore, we need to remove these weak factors, in other word, removing factors which are still highly correlated to X 1 from the set S i . Finally, to be consistent with the literature, we add the Fama-French 5 factors back into the OLS regression. In this way, we construct the set of factors S i . In our case, the total number of factors selected for at least one company is p 3 = #{∪ N i=1 S i } = 54. The following OLS regression is used to estimate β * i , the OLS estimator of β i :
Note that supp(β * i ) ⊂ S i . The adjusted R 2 is obtained from this estimation. Since we are in OLS regime now, significance tests can be performed on β * i . This yields the significant set of coefficients
It is also important to understand which factors affect which securities. Given the set of securities is quite large, it is more reasonable to study which classes of factors affect which classes of securities.
The classes of factors are given in Appendix A, and the classes of securities classified by the first 2 digits of their SIC code are in Appendix C. For each security class, we count the number of significant factor classes as follows.
Recall that N is the number of securities. Denote l to be the number of security classes. Denote the security classes by C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , ..., C l where l d=1 C d = {1, 2, ..., N }. Recall that the number of factors is p. Let the number of factor classes be m. Let the factor classes be denoted
.., p} and p is the number of factors which were significant for at least one of the security i. Also recall that β * is the OLS estimator of β in equation (16), so supp(β * ) ⊂ {1, 2, 3, ..., p}. Denote the significant count matrix to be A
In other words, each element a b,d of matrix A is the number of significant factors in factor class b, selected by securities in class d. Finally, denote the proportion matrix to be G
In other words, each element g b,d of matrix G is the proportion of significant factors in factor class b selected by security class d among all factors selected by security class d. Note that the elements in each column of G sum to one.
Our results show that the LASSO estimation selects a total of 54 factors from different sectors for at least one company. And all of these 54 factors are significant in the second stage OLS regressions after the LASSO estimation for at least one company. This validates our assumption that the total number of risk factors is large; much larger than 10 factors, which is typically the maximum number of factors seen in the literature (see Harvey, Liu, Zhu (2016) [9] ).
In addition, the results validate our sparsity assumption, that each company is significantly related to only a small number of factors (at a 5% level of significance). Indeed, for each company an average of 8.83 factors are selected by LASSO and an average of 4.15 factors show significance in the second stage OLS regression. In other words, the average number of elements in S i (see expression 16) is 8.83 and the average number of elements in S i (see expression 17) is 4.15. Figure  1 shows the distribution of the number of factors selected by LASSO and the number of factors that are significant in the second stage OLS regression. As depicted, most securities have between 1 ∼ 10 significant factors. Thus high dimensional methods are appropriate and necessary here. Table 1 provides the matrix G in percentage (each grid is 100 · g b,d where g b,d is defined in equation (19)). Figure 2 is a heat map from which we can visualize patterns in Table 1 . The darker the grid, the larger the percentage of significant factors. As indicated, different security classes depend on different classes of factors, although some factors seem to be shared in common. Not all of the Fama-French 5 factors are significant in presence of the additional factors in our model. Only the market portfolio shows a strong significance for nearly all securities. The emerging market equities and the money market ETF factors seem to affect many securities as well. As shown, all of the factors are needed to explain security returns and different securities are related to a small number of different factors.
Intercept Test
This section provides the tests for a zero intercept. Using the Fama-French 5-factor model as a comparison, Figure 6 compares the intercept test p-values between our Multi-factor model (MFM) SIC First 2 digits  0 12 13 14 15 16 17 20 21 22 23 24 25-28 29 30-38 39  California Munis  2  0  1  0  0  0  0  1  0  2  0  3  0  0  1  1  Corporate Bonds  2  4  3  1  0  3  6  3  0  5  7  6  4  2  3  4  Emerging Mkt. Bonds  1  2  2  1  1  1  0  5  2  2  2  0  2  2  2  5  Government Bonds  1  0  0  3  3  0  2  0  2  0  0  0  1  0  1  0  High Yield Bonds  4  6  7  5  7  7  2  3  5  3  2  0  3 2  8  5  1  1  5  2  5  8  3  0  6  5  7  2  2  RMW  2  0  2  0  1  2  1  5  0  2  0  0  5  2  3  3  CMA  1  2  3  3  0  5  0  4  2  2  0  3  3  9 3 1 2  0  2  5  2  2  3  3  4  0  3  4  1  5  3  2  RMW  2  0  1  3  3  1  3  4  0  6  4  4  5  9  4  2  CMA  5  0  2  5  2  2  3  3  4  0  3  3  3  0  2  2   Table 1 HML  10  4  6  2  2  4  3  3  3  6  2  3  4  3  4  RMW  2  3  0  2  8  3  2  3  3  0  7  3  5  5  5  CMA  4  2  6  2  0  4  3  0  2  0  1  0  2  3  2   Table 1 continued. and Fama-French 5-factor model (FF5). As indicated, 5.86% of the securities have significant intercepts in the FF5 model, while 6.91% of the securities in MFM have significant α's.
ETF Class
Since we replicate this test for about 5000 stocks in the CRSP database, it is important to control for a false discovery rate because even if there is a zero intercept, a replication of 5000 tests will have about 5% showing false significance. We adjust for the false discovery rate using the Benjamini-Hochberg (BH) procedure [2] and the Benjamini-Hochberg-Yekutieli (BHY) procedures [3] . The BH method does not account for the correlation between tests, while the BHY method does. In our case, each test is done on an individual stock, which may have correlations. So the BHY method is more appropriate here.
As noted earlier, Table 2 shows that 6.91% of stocks in the multi-factor model have p-values for the intercept t-test of less than 0.05. While in the FF5 model, this percentage is 5.86%. After using the BHY method to control for the false discovery rate, we can see that the q-values (the minimum false discovery rate needed to accept that this rejection is a true discovery, see [20] ) for both models are almost 1, indicating that there are no significant non-zero intercepts. All the significance shown in the intercept tests is likely to be false discovery. This is strong evidence that both models are consistent with the behavior of "large-time scale" security returns.
Goodness-of-fit Test
This section tests to see which model better fits the data. Figure 5 compares the adjusted R 2 's (see [21] ) between MFM and FF5 model. As indicated, MFM has more explanatory power. The mean adjusted R 2 for MFM is 0.375 while that for FF5 model is 0.227. We next perform an F-test, for each security, to show that there is a significant difference between the goodness-of-fit of MFM and the FF5 model In our case, the FF5 is the restricted model, having p − r 1 degrees of freedom and a sum of squared residuals SS R , where r 1 = 5 . The MFM is the full model, having p − r 1 − r 2 degrees of freedom (where r 2 is the number of factors in addition to FF5 in the second step OLS regression) and a sum of squared residuals SS F . Under the null-hypothesis that FF5 is the true model, we have
Again, it is important to test the false discovery rate. Table 3 contains the p-values and the false discovery rate q-values using both the BH method and BHY methods. As indicated, for most of the stocks, the MFM is significantly better than the FF5 model, even after considering the false discovery rate. For 77.81% of stocks, the MFM model is better than the FF5 at the significance level of 0.05. Even if we adjust our significance level to 0.01, there is still 59.08% of the stocks showing a significant difference. As such, this is strong evidence documenting the multi-factor model's superior performance in characterizing security returns.
Robustness Test
As a robustness test, for those securities whose intercepts were non-zero (although insignificant), we tested the multi-factor model to see if positive alpha trading strategies generate arbitrage opportunities. To construct the positive alpha trading strategies, we use the data from the year 2017 as an out-of-sample period. Recall that the previous analysis was over the time period 2014 to 2016. As explained above, we fit the MFM model using the data up to the last week of 2016. We then ranked the securities by their alphas from positive to negative. We take the top 50% of those with significant (p-val less than 0.05) positive alphas and form a long-only equal-weighted portfolio with 1$ in initial capital. Similarly, take the bottom 50% of those with significant negative alphas and form a short-only equal-weighted portfolio with -1$ initial capital. Then, each week over 2017, we update the two portfolios by re-fitting the MFM model and repeating the same construction.
Combining the long-only and short-only portfolio forms a portfolio with 0 initial investment. If the alphas represent arbitrage opportunities, then the combined long and short portfolio's change in value will always be non-negative and strictly positive for some time periods. The results of the arbitrage tests are shown in Figures 3 and 4 . As indicated, the change in value of the 0-investment portfolio randomly fluctuates on both sides of 0. This rejects the possibility that the positive alpha trading strategy is an arbitrage opportunity. Thus, this robustness test confirms our previous intercept test results, after controlling for a false discovery rate. Although not reported, we also studied different quantiles from 40% to 10% and they gave similar results. Table 3 : F test with control of false discovery rate. We do the F test and report its p-value, q-values for each company. The first column is the value range of p-values or q-values listed in the other columns. In the other three columns we report percentage of companies with p-value, BH method q-value, and BHY method q-value in each value range. The table shows that for most companies the increment of goodness of fit is very significant. 
Illustrations
In this section we illustrate our multi-factor estimation process and compare the results with the Fama-French 5-factor model (FF5) for three securities: Adobe, Bank of America, and NVIDIA.
Adobe
This section contains the results for Adobe. Using expression (13) , we estimate the Fama-French 5 factor model (FF5) as shown in Table 4 . For our multi-factor model (MFM), the final results are shown in Table 5 with the description of the ETF factors selected by LASSO in Table 5 : Adobe with the MFM. The column β provides the coefficients in the second-step OLS regression of Adobe on factors selected in the MFM. The standard error (SE), t value, and P-value related to each coefficient are also provided.
Bank of America
security returns (as a bank) are subject to risks related to the term structure of interest rates. It is also related to ProShares UltraShort Silver, which is not surprising since metals are a hedge against inflation. Finally, the α's in both models are not significantly different from zero, indicating that no arbitrage opportunities exist for this security.
NVIDIA
This section gives the results for NVIDIA, a technology company, in Tables 10, 11 , and 12. The adjusted R 2 for FF5 is 0.38, while the adjusted R 2 for our model is 0.48. For NVIDIA, the market return is the only FF5 factor that is significant. NVIDIA's security returns are correlated to Investment Grade Floating Rate which reflects the stability of its return series. Another interesting aspect for the NVIDIA result is that the intercept is significantly non-zero in both models, which seems to suggest a potential arbitrage opportunity. However, as shown in the previous intercept test section, this can just be false discovery and an arbitrage opportunity may not exist. 
Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to re-investigate the estimation of multiple factor models by relaxing the convention that the number of factors is small. The idea is to obtain the collection of all possible factors and to provide a simultaneous test, security by security, of which factors are significant. Since the collection of risk factors selected for investigation is large and highly correlated, we use high-dimensional statistical methods, including the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO) and prototype clustering methods to do the analysis. For comparison with the existing literature, we compare the multi-factor model's performance with the Fama-French 5-factor model. Both the Fama-French 5-factor and the multi-factor model are consistent with the behavior of "large-time scale" security returns. In a goodness-of-fit test comparing the Fama-French 5-factor with the multi-factor model, the multi-factor model has a substantially larger adjusted R 2 . This documents the multi-factor model's superior performance in characterizing security returns. Last, as a robustness test, for those securities whose intercepts were non-zero (although insignificant), we tested the multi-factor model to see if positive alpha trading strategies generate arbitrage opportunities. They do not, thereby confirming that the multi-factor model provides a reasonable characterization of security returns.
Our choice of dimension reduction techniques, using a combination of prototype clustering and LASSO, was motivated by our desire to select, from a collection of strongly correlated ETFs, a sparse and interpretable set of factors that explains cross-sectional variation among asset returns. These two steps were used as model selection tools to identify factors, and we subsequently estimated the model coefficients using OLS. In future, a more integrative method may be designed to combine the model selection and estimation steps. In addition, formal statistical inference in multi-factor models may be conducted by generalizing recent advances in the area of post-selection inference [24] and bias corrected versions of LASSO [13, 25] 
